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Migration of labor in response to structural changes in
the U.S. economy is explored. An empirical study of
the migration decision and wage determination is used
to evaluate: 1) whether unemployment plays a larger
role in motivating the decision to migrate than spatial
wage differences and 2) whether the population can be
characterized as homogeneous regarding migration and
wage determination. The results are used to evaluate
other studies involving the effects of migration on
wages. The effects of the differential mobility of
capital and labor is discussed. Policy is suggested
regarding improving labor mobility and impeding capital
flight.3
Plant closings in New England and the upper Midwest have
become a serious problem. Over the past 10 years [1975-851
over 10 million jobs have been lost, substantial amounts of
physical capital abandoned, and large resources of immateri-
al community capital and local infrastructure left useless.
While some fraction of these plant closings are due to the
normal ebb and flow of competitive markets sifting out the
less efficient producers, the larger part of this movement
is motivated by a desire on the part of management to 1)
shift the locus of their operations to areas where labor
commands a smaller share of the return and governments are
willing to provide a subsidy to the firm in the form of
services and reduced tax burdens, and 2) create a situation
where the threat of plant closing can be used
concessions from labor and local g0vernment.l
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the migration decision in
to force
order to
assess the effects of internal labor migration in the U.S.
associated with structural change. Of particular interest is the
role played by local unemployment in motivating migration and
whether homogeneity exists in the population with regard to
migration propensities. The main conclusions drawn are 1) unem-
ployment plays a larger role in motivating the migration decision
than spatial wage differences and, 2) heterogeneity with regard
to migration exists within the population.
In the movement from industrial to managerial capitalism,
the mobility of capital has been enhanced. Smaller investments
in fixed capital allows movements of relatively large businesses
without great loss of capital. This allows capital to take
advantage of local labor surpluses or move away from more power-
fully organized and more expensive labor markets. The lack of
' Sheehan (1985) pg. 423.4
mobility of labor with regard to capital means a loss of bargain-
ing power for labor. Higher capital mobility means greater
competition in labor markets as local markets become global in
nature and capital moves to take advantage of wage disparities.
Labor follows jobs and the movement of capital and restruc-
turing of the economy will result in higher levels of labor
migration if the capital stays in the U.S. How labor adjusts to
changing markets is addressed in this paper. Unravelling the
migration process can inform policy related to both labor and
capital movements.
Implicit in most studies of the migration of labor is the
view that locational decisions are voluntary. At the micro-
level, the human capital model suggested by Sjastaad (1961)
dominates the literature in many guises. In this model, migra-
tion is treated as an investment decision in which the location
with the best wage trajectory is chosen. At the macro-level,
labor movements are assumed to be dictated by regional character-
istics. Again, the migration decision is cast as voluntary as
labor chooses among various regions in order to enjoy the bene-
fits of local residence.
Part two discusses the costs and benefits of migration both
for the individual and the areas affected. In part three, the
role of interregional migration in closing twentieth century
racial wage gaps is discussed. In part four, various theories of
migration are sketched.
The role of unemployment in motivating and informing the5
migration decision is assessed in part five. Of interest is
whether migration can be viewed as an investment decision or a
decision coerced by the threat of unemployment. A wage/migration
model is estimated to determine the impact of unemployment on the
migration decision. The data reveal that unemployment plays a
larger role in motivating the migration decision than wage
differences associated with moving. Further, measured heteroge-
neity within the population with regard to wage determination and
migration calls into question research which has ignored this
fact. Policy implications and conclusions are considered in part
six.
2. The Social Costs and Benefits of Migration
In the transition from capitalism to managerialism, those
relegated to the surplus population will find their physical
and cultural existence threatened. To the extent that
blacks are viewed as the social problem (to the extent that
the National Research Council will mobilize resources to
study 'the Negro'), blacks will be the objects of social
management, rather than the social system as a whole being
viewed as the social problem. Not only will the question
'Who needs the Negro?' be voiced with greater frequency, but
the question 'Who is needed and who is not?' will be applied
broadly across the entire population. The answers are
likely to be as chilling as the question.  2
Where jobs exist labor gravitates towards them. When
capital shuts down, jobs go with it. Whether the movement of
labor can be considered voluntary in this regard is debatable.
In a location in which structural change from manufacture to
services occurs, labor is given the choice of adapting skills,
2 Darity (1990) pg. 250.6
which they might not possess, to a different line of lower paying
work or leaving the market. For workers in manufacture whose
educations and skills are not sufficient to move to service work,
the "choice" is the latter. If manufacture moves abroad, choices
for industrial labor become limited.
Studies have established that structural change and capital
flight are associated with displacing high paid workers not
accustomed to unemployment and untrained for other work. For
most of these workers, the only response to this dislocation
would be to seek employment elsewhere. Jacobson (1987), in a
study of the change in the employment structure of Pittsburgh
since the 195Os, shows that "leaving manufacturing was the most
costly feature of structural change. It was costly because most
displaced workers did not have enough schooling to qualify for
service sector jobs with comparable pay.lV3 Jacobson also notes
that "structural change reduced employment in industries where
attrition was low... a higher percentage of leavers had to be
displaced."4 In the period 1977-1982, Jacobson shows that "in
general, the employment declines were greatest in industries
where earnings were the highest in 1977."5
Labor has historically shown an ability to move for jobs.
However, migration involves costs incurred both by individuals
and society as a whole. Individuals incur both monetary and
3 Jacobson (1987) pg. 439.
4 ibid. pg. 444.
5 ibid. pg. 440.7
psychic costs associated with migration. On the societal level,
increased in-migration and out-migration are associated with
eroding social integration and diminishing the quality of life.
In-migration is often asbociated with economic benefits such as
job creation and increased real estate prices; out-migration is
associated with economic decline.
South (1987) shows that rapid population turnover is corre-
lated with increased deviant behavior in SMSAs. Using data
collected between 1975 and 1980 in the U.S., South shows statis-
tically significant positive impacts of in-migration on suicide,
violent crime, property crime and divorce rates. Out-migration
is shown to have statistically significant positive effects on
both violent and property crime rates and the divorce rate, but
was unrelated to the suicide rate.
the most commonly suggested explanation is that migration
disrupts social relationships and consequently reduces the
degree of social integration. This lack of integration
weakens constraints on deviant behavior, reduces social
support and control, and diminishes the probability that
concerned others will1 intervene to deter deviant be-
havior.. .Perhaps the most striking aspect of these finding
is the remarkable consistency of the effects of in-migration
across quite different social problems.6
South also notes that the unemployment rate has a statistically
significant positive effect on violent crime, but is unrelated to
the other social problems.
Migration involves a transfer of human capital. Individuals
educated and trained in one region migrating to another bring
with them productive assets and leave behind the social cost of
6 South (1987) pg.
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their education and upbringing. So long as the receiving area
can maintain demand for incoming labor, in-migration represents a
net gain. If labor demand slips, the demand for social services
might mitigate these gains.
Kahley (1989) measures the net gains of recent migration to
the South both in terms of human capital flows and the reduction
of poverty. Since a disproportionate number of migrants to the
South had relatively high levels of education and incomes,
average education levels increased and poverty levels decreased
between 1970 and 1985.
In-migration also increases the demand for local services.
Greenwood, et al (1986) measure a "migration multiplier" of
around 1.4 jobs created for each employed net migrant. Greenwood
(1985) also showed that migration led to both job growth and
overall economic growth in the South.
Redistributions of population associated with migration
involve social costs external to markets. That these costs are
understood by corporations is displayed in corporations' attempts
to hold local government and labor hostage to threats of shutdown
in order to gain wage and tax concessions.7 Viewing migration
as a voluntary process engaged in by labor ignores these social
costs imposed by easy mobility of capital. While structural
shifts that involve internal capital mobility might be viewed as
zero-sum reallocations from a national perspective, this view
ignores the social costs of the disruption associated with large
7 Sheehan (1985) pp. 423-249
population movements. A more troubling prospect is the cost of
industrial capital fligh,t and the problems associated with
dislocated workers with bo jobs to which to migrate.
3. Theories of Migration and Migration Studies
The study of migrat'on affords a unique opportunity to view
1
behavior in disequilibrium. In this way, we can consider the
mobility of labor a measure of the speed with which the economy
I
adjusts to close spatial/ wage and employment gaps. Theoretically,
occupations or areas which pay better will attract those from
lower paying areas or oc,cupations. Schultz (1975) considers the
I
ability of labor to adju! t
i'
behavior in disequilibrium a measure
of entrepreneurial ability. Those with a better ability to adapt
to changing market conditions can capitalize on short-term
I
dislocations in the market. A more vital economy, then, might be
/
considered one in which labor is most malleable. An economy of
this sort would be characterized by individuals with large
amounts of general skills. Provincial populations with a highly
specialized work force w uld be considered less vital.
The literature on m'gration is split between the study of
aggregate migration and
!
he study of the individual level migra-
tion decision. The aggr gate studies concentrate on the flows of
people among well-defined. areas. These studies typically explain
migration based on characteristics of the areas in question, and
some general demographic characteristics of the migrating and10
non-migrating populations. The individual-level data focuses
more on the motivations of movers and stayers and the study of
individual characteristics which condition the decision to
migrate.
In economics, the study of the individual migration decision
is traced to the work of Sjaastad (1962). Sjaastad proposed a
cost-benefit approach to the study. Benefits were measured as
the difference between the discounted value of the stream of
future earnings at the initial location and those of alternate
locations. Costs were measured in opportunity costs, distance of




PDE,,, = present discounted value of earnings in
location i(origin), j (potential destination)
C,. = 13 cost of moving between areas i and j
An index Ij greater than zero would trigger the decision to
migrate. Where more than two alternative destinations are
considered, the destination with the highest index would presum-
ably be chosen.'
This model has been adopted numerous times to analyze migra-
tions. What distinguishes one model from another is the choice
of how costs are defined and the proxy chosen for the present
* Sjaastad (1962) pp. 80-9311
discounted value of earnings. In cross-sectional data, it is
impossible to determine the earnings trajectory of an individual.
Typically, current wages are chosen as the best available proxy
for present discounted earnings streams. Alternate earnings
streams are never observed, although indirect methods for esti-
mating them exist.
Using good longitudinal data, it is theoretically possible
to distinguish earnings streams for different individuals. It is
still difficult to determine alternative earnings paths for a
given individual since data are only available for wages at
locations at which people actually worked. One can observe
earnings for individuals prior to migration and following migra-
tion, so more information on wages is available.
It is possible to indirectly estimate an individual's
earnings for different migration choices if data are available
for individuals in various locations. This is done using a
technique developed by Willis and Rosen (1979). To model the
selection of different education levels by individuals, Willis
and Rosen estimated different wage regressions for each level.
By applying the estimated parameters of the level not chosen to
the measured characteristics of the individuals, indirect esti-
mates were obtained for each individual. The estimated value of
the chosen level was used as a proxy for expected wage in that
group. The estimation involved a correction for self-selection
developed by Heckman (1976).
This technique was first applied to migration studies by12
Robinson and Tomes (1982) to analyze interprovincial migration in
Canada. Using census data, they estimated separate wage regres-
sions for each province. They hypothesized that different
talents or skills were compensated differently in different
provinces. Individuals would presumably select the province that
had the best match for their characteristics and move there,
provided that the costs of migration did not supersede the move.
Their proxy for lifetime earnings paths was a single obser-
vation of wages. Least squares wage regressions were estimated
for each province. In their estimation, they corrected for self-
selection using the Heckman method. The regressions yielded
parameters that were used to predict individuals' expected wages
in each province. Finally, they used these wage estimates to re-
estimate the index function originally estimated to correct the
wage regressions.
They found that selection bias was present in the initial
wage regressions, as the coefficient on the correction factor was
significant in many of the regressions and its presence in the
equations had large impacts on the other estimated coefficients.
They also determined that different individual characteristics
showed significance in explaining the probability of selecting
different provinces for residence. The findings led them to
question the results of the aggregated migration studies which
assume homogeneity of individuals, at least in labor market
characteristics.
In the study of migration in developing countries, Harris13
and Todaro (1970) proposed a model that attempted to explain
rural-urban migration in the presence of high urban unemployment.
Their's was an attempt to maintain an equilibrium model, with
wages sticky-downward, that would explain individual-level
behavior and market activity simultaneously. Sticky wages
explained the failure of the urban economy to lower wages in the
presence of unemployment. Individual perceptions of the proba-
bility of gaining employment after migration was the basis for
"equilibrating" migration to occur.
Equilibrium in the Harris-Todaro framework meant zero net
migration and rural wages equal to the conditional urban wage.
This conditional urban wage was based on the average wage and the
probability of receiving employment in the industrial sector.
The individual perceived this probability based on the number of
jobs available in the industrial sector and the number of people
queued for the jobs, in other words, the unemployment rate.
Stark (1984) adopts a different view of migration in LDCs.
She hypothesizes that migration is often undertaken to improve
relative standing in a community. In Stark's view, the relative
deprivation of an individual, or their perception of their
standing in local hierarchies motivates migration. Migration
propensities might be positively correlated with income. Howev-
er, if there is a high correlation between relative deprivation
and low income, the income/migration nexus might be capturing
this relationship. The empirical content of Stark's theory is
that independent of income levels, one would expect to see a14
higher propensity to migrate from regions or communities with
more unequal distributions of earnings or opportunities. This is
borne out empirically.
In a study of internal migration in the U.S., Akin, et al
(1979) employ a relative deprivation approach. "We are also
implicitly assuming that the worse the conditions within your
present local governmental jurisdiction are, the more likely you
are not only to move but also to move outside the juris-
diction."g They estimate a random coefficient Probit model of
the migration decision. Their estimation involves the standard
cost-benefit type of analysis. The random coefficient estima-
tion, however, allows them to account for the possibility that
actual earnings after migration might differ from the earnings
expected by the family when it chose to move. They find that the
random coefficient model performs better in the estimation of
their migration model than a fixed coefficient model.
Bartel (1979) decomposed the migration decision to incorpo-
rate different factors linked to labor market activities. Of
particular interest for Bartel was the relationship between job
mobility and physical mobility. She claimed that migration
defined as the movement over county borders, provincial borders,
or census regions was arbitrary. For her, the link between job-
related movements and the decision to change residences was
preeminent. She claimed that the probability of moving is really
the sum of the probabilities of quitting a job and moving, being
' Akin, Guilkey, and Sickles,(1979) pp. 239-240.15
laid off and moving, and moving with no job separati0n.l' The
conclusions Bartel draws which are of particular relevance for
this work are:
Economic theory predicts that ceteris paribus, the wage
should have a negative effect on the decision to migrate.
This article shows that the wage has a significant negative
effect only in the case of the joint probability of migrat-
ing and quitting. Moreover, this negative coefficient is
entirely due to the negative effect of the wage on the job
separation itself...
The wage gains from migration are also seen to depend on the
nature of the move and the age of the migrant. Of the three
types of moves, transfers in general lead to the largest
wage gains; this effect is significant, however, only for
the two younger cohorts. A quit related move is also found
to lead to larger payoffs than a layoff related move for all
three samples.'l
These studies point to two general observations about migra-
tion. First, jobs rather than wages seem to play a larger role
in motivating the migration decision. In terms of wage determi-
nation, this means that people are less likely to migrate to
close wage gaps than they are to close employment gaps. Second,
local conditions as perceived by the individual, both in the
region of origin and potential destination, play a major role in
the migration decision. A related issue addressed later in this
paper is whether we can consider migrants and non-migrants as
homogeneous in the labor market.
Migration is rarely included in wage regressions. However,
in the literature on secular changes in twentieth century racial
earnings gaps migration plays a central role. Migration of
lo Bartel (1980) pg. 777.
l1 Bartel (1979) pp. 785-786.16
blacks from the South between the world wars and following World
War II, along with alleged changes in both the quantity and
quality of education received by blacks, have been viewed as the
major causes of measured closure in earnings gaps. Migration has
typically been treated as an exogenous effect in the determina-
tion of earnings and the changes in earnings, clearly a mis-
specification if we believe wages are in some part determined by
choice of residence.
4. Closure of Wage Gaps: The Historical Role of Migration
One of the most striking results of the analysis of
1960 Census data is the finding that black returns to
education are erratic and much lower than for whites
even when some correction is made for their region of
birth. These discouraging results leave migration as
the only systematic means of improving the relative
income position of blacks, and furthermore the quick
gains from migration are never likely to be as great as
during the 1940's and 1950's.12
Migration was an important source of the long run closing of
the racial wage gap. Southern black migration to the North-
ern cities increased black-white male wage ratios by 11 to
19 percent between 1940 and 1980...The income gains from
migration, however, have diminished steadily over time and,
by 1970 were exhausted.13
Numerous descriptive studies have shown that the quantity of
education attained statistically "explains" a significant part
of the variation of wages across individuals. Other studies have
"explained" some part of the alleged closing of racial earnings
gaps by migration and the closing of racial gaps in the quantity
and quality of education received. Most notable in this line of
I2 Weiss and Williamson (1972) p. 372.
I3 Smith and Welch (1986) pp. xiii-xiv.17
research is the work of James Smith and Finis Welch. They have
attempted to show that market forces have indeed worked to close
wage gaps. They claim, further, that market forces have had a
larger impact on closing wage gaps than extra-market forces such
as desegregation of schools and civil-rights legislation.
According to Smith and Welch (1989), the main market forces
working to close wage gaps are the closure of educational quanti-
ty gaps and migration. They have also extended conjectures about
closure in racial educational quality gaps. The changes in
educational quantity and quality have served to upgrade the
quality of the human capital blacks have brought to the labor
market. Migration has mobilized these resources and moved them
to the area of their best allocation. The most significant
historical migrations in terms of labor market outcomes are the
South-North and the rural-urban migration of blacks. The average
wages of blacks rose as they chose to reside in and earn the
higher wages of urban and Northern areas.14
Migration and education are not unrelated. Robert Margo
(1988), among others, has noted the relationship between school-
ing and migration from the South. Margo claims that "a rising
rate of black out-migration was inevitable, driven by the steady
increase over time in southern black schooling." The assertion
that more education is associated with a higher propensity for
migration, especially among blacks. is particularly relevant to
I4 see, for instance, Smith and Welch (1986) and Smith and
Welch (1989).18
the convergence literature I5
In the returns to education literature there is great
interest in determining whether black migrants from the South
achieved better or worse labor market outcomes than their North-
ern counterparts. In this literature, migrants are treated as
equivalent to nonmigrants except with regard to the variables
included in the regressions. Whether migrants and nonmigrants
vary with regard to unobserved qualities that influence labor
market outcomes is not treated explicitly although it is often
mentioned in passing.16
Attempting to explain the racial variation in wages, Weiss
and Williamson (1972) asserted that substantial differences
existed in the quality of education received by blacks in the
North and South of the U.S. Without directly measuring the
quality of education in different regions, Weiss and Williamson
sought to infer differences in relative quality by accounting for
the area of educational origin in a wage regression. Controlling
for years of schooling, they compared coefficients on the region
of educational origin in wage regressions for individuals living
in various areas of the country. They used these estimates to
determine which region's educational experience had a significant
impact on the wages of blacks. They found, contrary to the view
espoused in the Coleman Report, that blacks educated in the rural
South did not suffer relative to blacks educated in either
I5 See Fein (1965) and Margo (1988).
l6 see Weiss and Williamson (1972).19
Southern urban areas or the North.17
This line of research was further extended by Adams and
Nestel (1976). They sought to explain urban poverty in the non-
South using information on the quantity and site of education for
blacks and whites in various regions. In particular, they wanted
to assess Masters'(1972) finding that migrants from the South
living in Northern metropolitan areas actually earned higher
wages than those who were educated and remained in the urban
North.l* They found that the negative impact on wages of the
area of origin of education for those whose education occurred in
the urban non-South was considerably larger for men aged 14-24
(young males) than for those aged 45-59 (mature males). They also
found limited sensitivity of the wages of whites to the area of
their educational origin-l9
McCarthy and Darity (1988) extended this analysis to more
recent data. The impact of the region of educational origin on
wages was estimated for data gathered on two cohorts in the
1970's and 1980's. Some of the same data sets used by Adams and
l7 This result was obtained once area of current residence
and age were accounted for. Area of residence at age 16 was used
as a proxy for site of educational origin. Weiss and Williamson
based their findings on data from the 1967 Survey of Economic
Opportunity and the Current Population Survey. They only looked
at the wages of blacks in their work.
'a Masters' finding directly contradicted the claim made in
the Coleman Report that mass migration of poorly educated South-
ern blacks accounted in part for the low educational levels and
returns to education for Northern blacks.
lg Adams and Nestel used data from the National Longitudinal
Survey from 1966. They controlled for differences in current
residence and quantity of education.20
Nestel were used, as well as wage data for more recent years".
This work supported the claim that migration from Southern rural
areas to urban and Northern areas increased the wages of blacks.
Further, these results suggested that the relative returns to
migration have diminished over time. However, they did not
indicate that returns to migration for blacks had ceased in the
1970's. While there is a definite decline in the returns to
migration for the two samples studied, the returns for the
younger cohorts remained positive and statistically significant.
Implicit in all these studies is the assumption that mi-
grants and nonmigrants are homogeneous. This homogeneity allows
one to infer that differences between movers and stayers are
based on attributes of the areas and not the individuals. If
variation in wages between movers and stayers is a consequence of
different unobserved personal characteristics, then inferring
that the site of education captures unobserved school-quality
characteristics is a misspecification.
Further, if migrants exhibit 'better' labor market charac-
teristics than nonmigrants, for instance a higher degree of
entrepreneurship as Schultz hypothesized, they would be expected
" The data sets employed for both the mature male (MM)
sample and the young male (YM) sample are based on the original
samples gathered in 1966 by the NLS. Since the samples were
pared down, first, according to whether a person earns income
and, second, according to whether they were enrolled in school,
the composition of the samples might differ between years. This
is particularly true for the YM cohort. Given that a large
portion of the sample aged 14-24 in 1966 were enrolled in school,
the estimates run on the same cohort from 1967-1981 contained a
different number of wage earners than the Adams/Nestel  sample.21
to earn higher wages tha
1
nonmigrants in either their destina-
tions or their areas of origin. In this case, the Smith and
Welch estimation of the contribution of migration to closure of
wage gaps would overestimate the impact of migration on wage
gaps. Inferring school quality differences based on site of
education would also be confounded.
5.1 A Model of Migration
In the human capital and equilibrium-based analyses, the
dominant view of the economic actor is that of an autonomous
agent acting within constraints to maximize lifetime utility. In
this view, the migration decision is cast as an investment
decision much like the education-level decision. Little atten-
tion is paid to external forces which condition behavior. The
formation of wage expectations might include some calculation of
the probability that the wages meet the expectation. The deci-
sion to migrate may also be influenced by layoffs or potential
layoffs in the area of residence. Certainly an agent who can
determine the present value of various streams of earnings in his
decision calculus will factor in the probability of finding and
maintaining employment.
In their estimation, Robinson and Tomes chose to ignore the
characteristics of regions as factors in the individual migration
decision. While macro models may be misspecified due to the
implicit assumption of homogeneity in the population, it is22
possible that the micro decision may still be conditioned on
economic and other characteristics of the areas of residence and
destinations.
In the economic world of Robinson and Tomes, a potential
migrant forms his decision to migrate based on some knowledge of
how regional markets value certain individual characteristics.
Never do the agents consider the possibility that their talents
will not be put to use if they migrate, by failing to find
employment. Conversely, the decision to leave may be influenced
by a push factor, namely the inability to find work due to
capital flight. In either case, the point made by Akin, et al
that randomness affects the ability of an individual to bring
income expectations to fruition is well taken.
Rather than modelling wage realizations as a random effect,
a proxy could be used instead to capture another dimension of
wage expectations. In the spirit of both the Harris-Todaro and
Stark models, the unemployment rates in the labor markets of
origin and destination are employed. It is hypothesized that an
individual will form an expectation of wages if he moves or stays
based on his perception of the economic viability of the area, or
his relative standing in the community if unemployed. The
probability of moving will be higher if higher unemployment
exists or is expected in the local market.
Individuals are expected to choose to migrate to an area of
better economic opportunity once the decision to move is made.
These would be areas with lower unemployment measures. The model23
also includes the number of weeks unemployed in the year of the
migration decision as an indicator of an individual's employment
expectations.
The unemployment rate of the destination labor market is
expected to exert a negative impact on the probability of migra-
tion.*l Likewise, a high unemployment rate for the market of
origin is expected to exert a positive impact on migration
propensity. Weeks unemployed is also expected to have a posi-
tive effect on migration.
To capture differences in migration behavior based on race,
two race dummy variables are included. The first designates
blacks and the second those listed as "other" in the race vari-
able in the data. Akin, et al estimate a positive but insignifi-
cant effect for whites in both the standard and random coeffi-
cient Probit estimations. Goss and Paul (1987) show a positive
and statistically significant effect for whites' propensity to
migrate relative to blacks. A negative effect is expected for
both blacks and 'others' in the estimation.
The rest of the specification is similar to the human
capital model of migration suggested by Sjaastad. Costs include
measures of the education level, work experience, number of
dependents, a dummy variable indicating whether an individual had
ever migrated previously, marital status, and a dummy variable
indicating whether health problems limited the kind of work an
*' The destination labor market is the market of origin for
those who do not move.24
individual could perform.
It is hypothesized that an individual who has migrated
previously will be more likely to migrate again. This is consis-
tent with the idea that the population is heterogeneous with
regard to migration. A "migrant class" might be more willing to
move around for a variety of reasons relative to a "provincial
class" within the labor force. The unobserved variables that
influence a current migration decision likely will be captured in
past migrations.
From the investment perspective, the cost of migration is
hypothesized to be lower for a person who has migrated before, in
both psychic and real terms. In the model estimated by Akin, et
al, the number of different states in which an individual had
lived displayed a statistically significant positive effect in
explaining probability of migrating. Here, it is hypothesized to
have a positive effect, as well.
The effect of education on the propensity to migrate is an
issue of concern. If we consider education to be transferable
general training, higher education levels would be expected to
give individuals better abilities to respond to disequilibria as
Schultz suggests. Margo measured a positive association between
education and migration in historical studies. Akin, et al, show
a positive but insignificant effect of education on migration.
Robinson and Tomes show a positive and often statistically
significant effect of education on migration from most provinces.
In the cost-benefit framework, education generally raises25
the cost of migration by raising the opportunity cost in lost
wages. It also raises the benefits by increasing the value of
lifetime earnings. A rational individual would probably migrate
to the destination that puts the highest premium on education if
his education level is high. Since costs are borne once for a
migration but benefits last a lifetime, a positive effect of
education on migration is expected.
As family size increases, costs of moving increase, hence a
negative impact of the number of dependents on migration is
expected. Health problems may hinder migration, however, migra-
tion to places in which certain climates favor certain disabili-
ties (desert climate for asthmatics, for instance) may promote
migration. In this case, health problems that hinder migration
by raising costs are expected to dominate.
A high wage enjoyed in a potential destination is expected
to have a positive effect on migration. Given that wage differ-
ences in excess of costs are expected to trigger migration,
higher wages should be linked to those who migrate. Higher wages
paid in the area of origin are expected to have a negative effect
on migration. As one increases wages it is less likely that he
will find alternative employment with higher wages elsewhere.
Work experience is expected to have a negative effect on
migration probability. As one accumulates both specific training
and seniority with work experience, both often not transferable,
the cost of migration increases.
For the estimation of the model, the same technique used by26
Robinson and Tomes is adopted. It is a three-stage technique
which first estimates the probability of migrating based on human
capital and cost of migration variables. The estimated probabil-
ities from the first stage are used to create correction factors,
the inverse of the Mills ratio calculated from the estimated
probabilities of the Probit estimation. These are included as
regressors in wage regressions estimated separately for migrants
and nonmigrants. The results of the initial Probit estimation
appear in Table 2. The wage regression estimates appear in Table
3.
Finally, the original Probit estimation is repeated, using
the coefficients from the wage equations to proxy the wage
benefits of migration. Two "permanent wage" rates for migrants
and nonmigrants are calculated. The WAGE DIFF variable is the
ratio of the migrant to nonmigrant wage estimates for each
individual. The results of the reestimated index function appear
in Table 4a. The index function is also estimated with dummy
variables indicating regions of origin. These results appear in
Table 4b.
Given that the model hinges on the estimation of wage bene-
fits, different specifications of the estimated wage benefits
were made. First, arithmetic differences between the wage
estimates of migrants and nonmigrants, rather than the ratios of
wage estimates were tried. Since the estimates were linear
combinations of some of the variables included in the model, some
of these were left out of the model estimated. These resultsappear in Table 4c.
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As a further extension of the model, separate wage regres-
sions were estimated for migrants and nonmigrants in each area of
destination. The results of the wage regressions appear in Table
5. The coefficients were used to estimate eight potential wages
for each individual, a migrant and nonmigrant wage for each
region. These were then used to construct conditional wage
estimates for each individual based on the area of origin and the
migrant wages for the other destinations. These estimates were
used to reestimate the index function using the highest alternate
wage as the measure of the potential benefits of migrating. The
results of this estimation appear in Table 4d.
5.2 THE DATA
The data used for this study were collected as part of the
National Longitudinal Survey of the Labor Market Experience of
Youth (NLSY). The original participants were between the ages of
14-22 in 1979. They were interviewed yearly. The data used here
span the years 1979-1987.
The sample contains only males not currently enrolled in
school or college. Zero-earners are included in the wage regres-
sion, which diverges from the standard practice of using the log-
wage specification as the dependent variable. The hourly wage
variable is created by dividing yearly wages by the number of
hours worked in a year. Wages were then deflated by yearly28
regional price indices.'* Rather than estimate separate equa-
tions for blacks and whites, dummy variables were created to
identify blacks and those classified as 'other' in the variable
denoting race.
Yearly data about the region of residence were used to
determine whether an individual moved between regions. Informa-
tion about lifetime residence was used to determine whether an
individual had ever migrated. Local labor market conditions were
available directly from the data, as were the number of weeks
unemployed. Other variables included in the regressions were:
marital status, valued 1 for married, 0 otherwise; health prob-
lems, valued 1 if health problems limited the kind of work an
individual could perform, 0 otherwise; work experience, computed
as AGE-HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED-6; the number of dependents,
valued as the actual number.
Since those enrolled in schools were dropped from the
sample, different numbers of yearly observations were available
for different individuals. The complexity of longitudinal
estimation is increased when incomplete series for individuals
abound. It was decided to negate the time effect by deflating
the wage estimates using yearly regional price indices. It was
also decided to treat each year as a separate, independent,
migration decision. In this way, the data could be pooled over
individuals and years to estimate essentially a large cross-
22 These were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1990.29
section.
The sample differs from a cross-section in one important
way. Data for different years allows for information on wages on
both sides of the migration decision. This is not possible in
true cross sections and should improve the predictive power of
the model.
Treating each observation as an independent observation,
however, has some theoretical problems. First, unobserved vari-
ables which influence both wage and migration determination for
individuals is likely to influence the same individuals in the
same ways from year to year. This will build in some correlation
between the errors for the same individual across years. This
correlation was not accounted for. The unobserved variables are
assumed to be uncorrelated with variables included in the model
so the estimations will lose some efficiency, but should not be
biased.
5.3 RESULTS
Table 1. presents the means for the variables used based on
migration status. Those who migrate have a higher than average
value for ever migrating. Blacks, and "others", have a slightly
higher representation in the non-migrant group. Migrants have
higher than average education levels, lower than average unem-
ployment rates in the markets of their destinations and origins,
higher than average number of weeks unemployed in the year30
previous to migration, lower than average number of dependents,
health problems, current hourly wage, lagged hourly wage, percent
married, and work experience.
The coefficients estimated in the first Probit equation,
reported in Table Z., are unsurprising. Ever migrating shows a
positive and highly statistically significant effect on the
propensity to migrate. Being of the black or 'other' races has a
negative effect. The effect is statistically significant for
'others' while it is not for blacks. Education level exerts a
positive effect on migration as does the lagged unemployment rate
and number of weeks unemployed. These effects are all statisti-
cally significant at at least the .05 level. The unemployment
rate in the destination market, the past wage, whether an indi-
vidual is married, and work experience all show statistically
significant negative effects. Number of dependents, health
problems and current wage show negative but insignificant ef-
fects.
The effect of the wage received in the region of origin has
a significant negative influence on the probability of migrating.
This stands in contrast to the insignificant coefficient on
destination wage, the wage after migration has occurred. Better
information is available about wages before the migration deci-
sion is made than wages afterwards. This supports the hypothesis
of Akin et al that expected wages may not always correspond to
actual wages after migration. As we shall see, wages do not in




The fact that the local unemployment
llowing the migration decision play a s
rates prior to and
ignificant role in pre-
dicting the probability of migration supports the hypothesis that
job security and local economic health play an important role in
determining whether to migrate. The significant coefficient on
weeks unemployed in the year previous to migration provides addi-
tional support.
In the wage regressions for migrants and nonmigrants report-
ed in Table 3., there is at least one striking result. The fit
of the model for the nonmigrants appears much better than the fit
for migrants. All of the estimated parameters in the nonmigrant
regression are statistically significant at the .05 level. Few
of the parameters in the migrant equation are.
The return to education is slightly higher for nonmigrants.
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant for
both migrants and nonmigrants. Work experience gives a slightly
higher return for the migrants. The average wages for blacks is
lower relative to whites. This difference is statistically
significant for nonmigrants but not so for migrants. The coeffi-
cient is quite a bit larger in absolute value for nonmigrants, as
well. This may indicate that migration selects between heteroge-
neous subpopulations of blacks or that entering the migrant class
puts blacks at an equal advantage (disadvantage) to whites. The
coefficients for the 'other' category show the same results.
Number of dependents, health and marital status, bear little32
influence in predicting the wages of migrants. For nonmigrants,
however, all of these estimated parameters are statistically
significant. The signs on the coefficients estimated on the Mills
ratio differ in sign, with the parameter from the nonmigrant
equation of statistical significance. The negative coefficient
in the nonmigrant indicates that negative selection occurred for
this group. This means that on average those who migrated made
more, ceteris paribus, than the nonmigrants would have had they
moved. The positive coefficient in the estimation for migrants
indicates that positive selection occurs, meaning that migrants
would have made more than nonmigrants had they chosen to stay.
This effect is not statistically significant, however.
That the fits of these two models differ indicates that a
different structure of wage determination for migrants and non-
migrants might exist, evidence of heterogeneity between the two
groups. In order to determine whether the differences are
statistically significant, a Chow test was performed on the
regression equations. The test for homogeneity of the wage
equations failed the significance test at the .Ol level.23
The reestimation of the Probit for the propensity to migrate
using the estimated wages from the wage regressions shows strik-
ingly similar coefficients to the original probit. The results
are reported in Table 4a. The WAGE DIFF. variable was obtained
23 In order to perform the test a pooled regression was run.
Comparison of the sum of squared errors from the pooled and the
two separate regressions yielded the F-statistic: F = 18.67
The critical value for F with 8 numerator and infinite denomina-
tor degrees of freedom is 4.86 at the .Ol level.33
by dividing the estimated migrant wage by the estimated non-
migrant wage. It is statistically insignificant, indicating that
wage differences have little influence on the migration decision.
The other variables have the same interpretation as in the
original probit estimation.
An alternative specification, including dummy variables
denoting regions of origin was also estimated. The results are
reported in Table 4b. The West dummy was omitted for estimation
purposes. The only region of origin which showed a significant
probability of outmigration was the North Central. Given that
the data spans the years 1979-1987, this is probably a result of
the decline of the auto and steel industries in the central
region. The interpretation of the other coefficients remains the
same as in the previous estimations.
Defining WAGE DIFF as the arithmetic difference between
estimated wages of migrants and nonmigrants showed no better
performance in the estimation. The results are reported in Table
4c. The coefficient on wage remains insignificant while the
other coefficients have values similar to the previous estima-
tion.
Defining WAGE DIFF as the ratio of the highest alternative
migrant wage for an individual living in a particular region to
the nonmigrant wage of that region yields similar results. These
results appear in Table 4c. Again, the other estimated coeffi-
cients remain stable and the coefficient on WAGE DIFF is not
statistically significant.34
The wage regressions reported in Table 5. again show nega-
tive selection bias for all the stayers equations. This indi-
cates that stayers would make less on average than movers if they
had moved. However, no conclusion can be drawn about the movers,
given that none of the estimated coefficients are significant.
This is further evidence of heterogeneity in the population
between migrants and non-migrants.
Wages play a smaller role in the migration decision than
theorized. That unemployment variables play a larger role in
influencing the migration decision is striking. It calls into
question the migration-as-investment slant of the analysis and
casts migration as a process in which individuals are compelled
to engage rather than one in which they choose to engage.
6.1 Conclusions
That labor follows jobs is unsurprising. That labor doesn't
necessarily move to improve wages is. The idea that labor and
capital can be considered similar in that they mobilize in order
to get the best returns must be questioned. It appears that the
costs of migration for labor outweigh most of the benefits from
moving except when moving means finding employment.
The origin of regional wage differences reflects the lack of
mobility of labor. That capital takes advantage of these wage
differences is obvious. Migration, when viewed as a voluntary
transaction, can be considered the manifestation of labor's
ability to follow capital around. How market circumstances35
change is of concern here.
Why did General Motors, owners of underutilized capital all
over the North Central U.S., decide to build its new Saturn
plant in Tennessee? Or why do financial services choose to put
main offices in South Dakota or Ireland? Why do companies like
Morrell or Champion International or Sears threaten to close or
move their operations unless local governments and labor grant
them concessions in the form of tax breaks, lower wage demands
variances in environmental protection regulations? Capital
certainly understands the costs to communities of job loss and
out-migration.
Industrial capital has moved south to capitalize on pools
or
of
cheap, unorganized labor and to benefit from favorable tax incen-
tives. Financial services, far more mobile with the advent of
worldwide information technology advances, can locate wherever
local labor and government fiscal policies benefit them the most.
The recently coined "managerial age" in the U.S. involves the
shift of industrial production abroad and production in the U.S.
being devoted more to service related work.
While perfect mobility of resources may seem a desirable
attribute in terms of economic efficiency, the spatial mobility
of labor in the wake of capital mobility has external costs.
Dissolution of families and communities accelerates with in-
creased labor movements. Difficult to quantify quality of life
measures deteriorate with increased mobility. And the threat of
capital flight gives leverage to companies asking for tax or36
other concessions from local governments. Further, the inability
of labor to follow capital abroad could spell disaster for
certain segments of the work force. So long as the threat of
unemployment or the cessation of local growth rates exist,
capital can set the terms of trade between it, labor, and local
government.
In this paper, I showed that unemployment in origin and
destination labor markets plays a larger role in explaining
migration than wage differences between markets. This is consis-
tent with two models of migration suggested for developing
countries. In the model of Harris and Todaro, urban unemployment
equilibrates expected wage differences between urban and rural
areas and limits migration to the cities. In the relative
deprivation approach of Stark, local unemployment proxies rela-
tive deprivation of those out of work and motivates their deci-
sion to migrate.
That unemployment plays such a large role in motivating the
migration decision contradicts the human capital view of migra-
tion as a voluntary investment decision. Akin to the decision of
labor to work or starve, migration involves the decision to move
or adapt to a lower standard of living. To treat this as a
voluntary decision is ludicrous.
Further, the results of this work indicate that inferring
school quality differences based on data about regions of school-
ing is a misspecification. That selection bias occurs in migra-
tion and is reflected in wages of migrants and nonmigrants is37
undeniable. The assumption of homogeneity between migrants and
nonmigrants is clearly incorrect. Whether the variation in
individual wages can be decomposed into individual and regional
factors remains to be seen.
The estimation of the effects of migration in the closing of
racial wage gaps must be questioned, as well. If selection bias
occurs, higher wages of migrants may not indicate a general im-
provement if they would have made higher than average wages
staying put. The estimates of the impact on migration on closing
wage gaps will consequently be overestimated. It is obvious that
the migration issue must be more fully explored before using
migration as a basis for indirect inference.
6.2 Policy Suggestions
The lack of mobility of labor relative to capital presents a
problem. Public policy can take two directions. First, it can
attempt to enhance the mobility of labor and minimize the social
costs of higher mobility of the work force. Second, it can
impede the mobility of capital and weaken its bargaining position
relative to labor and local government.
Labor mobility can be enhanced by increasing general skills,
particularly those that are transferable to varieties of occupa-
tions. This can be achieved with increases in both education
levels and general training of the work force. Further, retrain-
ing of displaced labor will improve its mobility. This increase
in labor mobility between segments of the work force diminishes38
migration. The social costs of increased migration will be
obviated as labor in the transition from industrial production to
service might not have to move in order to maintain employment.
Given that capital has little stake beyond pecuniary inter-
ests locally, increased mobility of capital is perceived to be a
threat to localities as well as countries. Policy implications
seem clear. Efforts should be made to limit the mobility of
capital and to improve the ability of communities to influence
its movements. Constraints might be legislated for capital
movements at the national level. These might include ample
warning periods before large layoffs and size limits placed on
the export of capital.
On the local level, the bargaining ability of local govern-
ments and labor might be enhanced by enabling localities to
procure abandoned capital. While the means for communities to
take control of abandoned plants exists, they are seldom used.
Sheehan (1985) points out that there are many reasons to believe
that community-owned plants might be profitable when private
enterprise finds it unprofitable.
Unprofitability of the plant might be a misperception,
intentionally or unintentionally promoted by the corporation.
This is based on the "unwillingness of the corporation to write
down [the plant's] capital value reflecting its real earning
capacity," because it reduces a corporation's reported earnings.
Further, if the corporation is using flight as a bargaining ploy,
potentially cost-effective plants might be misrepresented as39
unprofitable. Cost effective plants might be closed by corpora-
tions in order to limit production and raise prices.24
Many of the benefits of maintaining a plant in a community
might accrue to the community and not the corporation. Tax reve-
nues and the demand for local services would decline with a plant
closing, both benefits enjoyed by the community but not the
corporation. Administration of the plant might be cost effective
for the community because much of it can be done by the existing
government administration.25
Production might be enhanced by a more cooperative disposi-
tion of labor towards the local management of the firm. Invest-
ment through municipal bond sales provides a cheaper means of
borrowing than that available to firms, further enhancing produc-
tive potential. Net income is tax free, and more easily rein-
vested.26
Procurement of abandoned capital can either occur through
the purchase of plants from corporations or through condemnation
and eminent domain measures. While the resistance of corpora-
tions is expected, it is incumbent on local governments to
protect the interests of its citizenry.27 General cynicism
about government's inability to manage production efficiently
will be dispelled with a few successes.
24 Sheehan (1985) pp. 426-27
25 ibid 427-28 pp.
26 ibid. 427-428 pp.
27 ibid. 429-31 pp.40
Local control of abandoned capital will alleviate the flight
of labor in search of jobs and decrease the social costs of
migration. Larger scale use of abandoned capital by the federal
government might be considered in the longer run. Essential to
any legislation regarding limiting the mobility of capital is a
commitment on the part of the national and local governments to
resist the transition from industrial to managerial capitalism.41
TABLE 1.
Means for Variables by Miqration Status
VARIABLE NON - MIGRANT ALL
MIGRANT
EVER MIGRATE .586 . 839 -594
BLACK .256 .212 -254
OTHER .053 . 027 .052
HI GRADE COMP 11.841 12.609 11.867
UE RATE (DEST) 3.397 3.190 3.390
UE RATE (ORIG) 3.403 3.329 3.400
WEEKS UNEMPLOYED 6.286 6.967 6.309
NUM. DEPENDENTS .424 .322 .421
HEALTH . 039 . 029 .031
WAGE (DEST) 5.836 5.811 5.835
WAGE (ORIGIN) 4.858 4.494 4.846
MARRIED .296 .241 .294
WORK EXPERIENCE 5.224 4.401 5.196
NONMIG 24987 MIG 87042
TABLE 2.
BINOMIAL PROBIT ESTIMATION OF PROPENSITY TO MIGRATE




Waqe Reqressions for Miqrants and Nonmiqrants
Usinq Tobit Estimation
VARIABLE MIGRANT I T-STAT I NON-MIGRANT T-STAT
INTERCEPT 5.204 9.97
HI GRADE COMP -.004 0.45 1.22 45.49
EXPERIENCE . 113 1.27 ,567 29.80
BLACK -2.605 5.18 -1.733 15.61
OTHER -3.168 2.75 -.640 3.04
DEPENDENTS -.140 0.46 . 303 5.24
HEALTH 0.013 1.32 -1.541 5.72
MARRIED I . 734 I 1.41 I 1.004 I 8.83
MILLS RATIO . 009 19.50 -14.169 12.12
sigma 9.276 48.37 7.119 206.48
Log Lklihd p=.ooo -77189 p=.ooo44
TABLE 4a.
Binomial Probit Est. of Propensity to Miqrate
Usins Waqe Estimates from Table 3.
WAGE DIFF define as ratio of miqrant to nonmiqrant waQe
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT
INTERCEPT -2.451 . 128 19.12
I
EVER MIGRATE I  .037 )  15.38
BLACK -.067 . 038 1.77
OTHER -.275 . 082 3.33
HI GRADE COMP. . 045 . 007 5.81
UE RATE (DEST) -.lOO .018 5.49
1
UE RATE (ORIGIN) . 048 -017 2.70
I I
WEEKS UNEMPLOYED . 006 B 001 4.45
DEPENDENTS -.017 . 021 -803
HEALTH -.050 . 089 .551
WAGE DIFF . 001 . 005 .314
MARRIED -.115 . 039 2.96
WORK EXPERIENCE -.026 .006 4.21
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 457.59 df - 12 p-val=
. 00045
TABLE 4b.
Binomial Probit Est. of Propensity to Migrate
Usins Waqe Estimates from Table 3.
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT
WAGE DIFF.46
TABLE 4c.
Binomial Probit Est. of Propensity to Misrate
Usinq Waqe Estimates from Table 3.
Waue diff. defined as difference of Miqrant waqe and Nonmiqrant
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT47
TABLE 4d.
Binomial Probit Est. of Propensity to Miqrate
Usins Waqe Estimates from Table 3.
Waqe Diff. defined as ratio of hiqhest alternative waqe
and nonmiqrant WAGE
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT
OTHER48
TABLE 5.
Waqe reqressions Estimated for Separate Reqions
Correctinq for Selection Effect of Migration
** significant at .Ol level or less. * significant at .05 level.49
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